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Identity & API Security Track 7 · AI & Agents
0/166 lessons read
AI & AGENTS · LESSON 7

A secure copilot, step by step

This is the capstone. A support copilot reads Maya's documents and acts for her. It needs every control in this track, working together. Your goal: follow one copilot from question to action, and see where each control sits.

Key points
  • Authorize the read, then govern the act.
  • The copilot has the user's access, never more.
  • Every tool call runs the same governed pipeline.
  • Money moves only after the person approves.
  • Delegation can only make authority smaller.

Two powers, two risks

A useful copilot looks things up, and retrieval can show a document you should not see. It also does things, and a tool call can use more authority than you have. So check every read and every action against your permissions. One rule ties this lesson together: authorize the read, then govern the act.

Governed reading: filter every chunk

The copilot first retrieves passages from a knowledge base. That search does not know who you are. Asking the model politely not to leak is not enough. A clever prompt ("ignore your instructions…") can talk it into leaking. So the copilot runs a fine-grained authorization check on every retrieved chunk. It drops the denied chunks before the model writes anything. The model never receives text you cannot see. This is permission-aware retrieval built on relationship checks.

Whose access? Yours.

The copilot has no broad access of its own. It inherits exactly your document access, so its reach is never bigger than yours. This avoids the confused deputy. That is a program with wide privileges that an attacker tricks into working for them. Tie the copilot to your identity. Then every check asks "May this user do this?" and not "May the copilot?"

Think of it like…

A concierge runs errands with your membership card, not a master key to the hotel. With your card, they open only the doors you could open. With the master key, any guest who sweet-talks them can enter any room.

Maya (you)Copilot (Kai)acts as YOURead · FGA on every chunkAct · governance pipelineStep-up · human approves $Delegate · OBO narrows scope
Figure — One copilot, four governed abilities. Everything hangs off your identity. It reads only what you may read. It acts only through the governed pipeline. It stops for you on spending. It delegates only with less power.

Governed acting: the same pipeline, plus a human

A tool call gets no private back door. It runs the same MCP governance pipeline as every agent, in this order:

  1. An input guardrail on the arguments.
  2. An on-behalf-of token exchange.
  3. A scope check on the new token.
  4. A relationship check for this tool.
  5. For a write: a pause for a step-up approval.
  6. The handler, the code that does the work.
  7. An output guardrail that scrubs anything sensitive.

Reading a balance is low risk, so it just runs. Spending money is not. A write tool triggers an approval. The copilot stops and shows you the exact deal: "₹500 · 5 GB add-on · ref BUY-4821". Nothing is charged until you approve.

Delegation only narrows

Say the copilot needs your billing data. The lazy move reuses its own broad read-and-write token. A tricked copilot could then use that power to write. The safe way is delegation with narrowing. A second on-behalf-of exchange (RFC 8693) gives a dedicated billing agent a read-only token, with write removed. The billing agent still acts for you. But it can do only one narrow thing. Both hops are audited, so both agents show up in the agent registry.

MayaCopilot (Kai)Billing agent1 · ask a billing question (you = read + write)2 · OBO: subject=Maya, scope → read-only3 · billing data (write can't happen)4 · answer — both hops audited
Figure — Two hops, and authority only shrinks. If the copilot were hacked, the delegated token still could not write. An agent that hands on more power than it holds can turn one hacked agent into a fleet-wide breach.
Why it matters

Five controls work together: governed MCP tools, fine-grained authorization, permission-aware retrieval, strong approvals and an agent registry. Together they make ONE assistant you can trust. It even borrows third-party keys the safe way, through a federated token vault.

🧪 Interactive lab — enable JavaScript to play with this one.

🧪 Try it free

Check whether your delegation really narrows authority. Grade an on-behalf-of exchange with Token Exchange Check.